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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
PROFESSOR KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.  
On behalf of the DeStefano Family, I’d like to welcome you here 
tonight.  This is the thirteenth Annual DeStefano Lecture, and I have had 
the privilege of making introductory remarks in all previous DeStefano 
Lectures.  Tonight is different, however, because unfortunately our good 
friend Al passed away a few months ago. 
We will greatly miss him.  He climbed the ladder of success one 
rung at a time.  As a night student, he worked his way through law 
school, while a member of the Law Review, and he still graduated at the 
top of his class.  He then went on to become a partner in the Becker 
firm, specializing in corporate matters with an emphasis on mergers and 
acquisitions.  He was active in numerous charitable endeavors and was 
an extremely popular adjunct professor on our faculty, sharing his 
enormous knowledge and experience with our students.  He was all 
these things, but most of all he was a devoted husband, father, 
grandfather, and a friend.  He was a role-model to all those around him. 
Al will be missed by all who knew him, but I am consoled by the 
words of an old ballad, which I first heard as a young boy and which 
still rings in my ears.  These words were expressed by General Douglas 
MacArthur in his famous farewell speech to Congress over sixty years 
ago when he referred to a popular army barracks ballad—“old  soldiers 
never die, they just fade away,” and “like the old soldier of that ballad, I 
now close my . . . career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to 
do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.” 
Al was just such a soldier who succeeded in whatever he tackled, 
and always with grace, compassion, dignity, and integrity.  Accordingly, 
Al DeStefano will never die and, through this Lecture series, his 
memory will never fade away. 
Over the years, the DeStefano Lectures have covered a wide range 
of timely and diverse topics such as the need for market regulation, the 
demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur Andersen, strengthening the 
protection for investors, making our capital markets more transparent, 
the subprime mortgage meltdown, and greater corporate and 
governmental accountability. 
Two years ago, we were treated to Judge Rakoff’s thought 
provoking lecture entitled “Are Federal Judges Competent?  Dilettantes 
in an Age of Economic Expertise.”  Last year we were treated to 
Professor James Stewart’s discussion of those who “Hide Behind the 
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Corporate Veil,” which in essence, expanded on the principle of piercing 
the corporate veil established by Professor I. Maurice Wormser over a 
century ago. 
Tonight, we are in for another treat, as our speaker is J. Travis 
Laster, a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.  Vice 
Chancellor Laster cannot be described as an old soldier.  Indeed, the title 
of young warrior is more appropriate, considering how much he has 
accomplished at such an early age. 
Vice Chancellor Laster received his undergraduate degree from 
Princeton summa cum laude and his J.D. and Masters from the 
University of Virginia.  He clerked for the Honorable Jane R. Roth of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit before beginning a most 
successful career in private practice, specializing in litigation and 
transactional matters involving Delaware corporations and entities.  His 
list of accomplishments, awards, and memberships in professional 
organizations are too numerous to list and are easily found in Google. 
More importantly, Fordham Law School has always associated 
itself with the phrase “In the Service of Others.”  It should be no 
surprise, therefore, that when I was perusing the Vice Chancellor’s 
background for purposes of tonight’s introduction, I was most impressed 
by an interview he had a few years ago held shortly after his 
appointment to the bench. 
The question was asked of him: Why did you want to make the 
change from private practice to a member of the judiciary? 
Vice Chancellor Laster responded: “The call to public service is 
very important to me.  My parents were models in this regard.  They are 
both teachers.  I always knew that I wanted to do some type of public 
service, and being on the Court of Chancery was my ‘dream job.’” 
While performing the duties of his dream job, he has authored and 
participated in many important opinions, not the least of which is his 
relatively recent opinion in In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.1  
That case involved a challenge to a proposed merger between Revlon 
and its controlling shareholder.  In a forty-six page opinion, he 
challenged a practice where some law firms would engage in 
opportunistic filings of representative actions on behalf of shareholders 
with small stakes, only to let the litigation lie dormant until settlement 
and the collection of their fees.  He described such conduct as “frequent 
                                                                                                         
 1. 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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filer” plaintiffs’ counsel in shareholder class actions and proceeded to 
replace co-lead counsel—in effect raising the bar as to what constitutes 
acceptable performance by counsel in such important litigation. 
Tonight, Vice Chancellor Laster’s topic of discussion is “Revlon is 
a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means.”  But that is 
not the same Revlon discussion referred to previously.  The Revlon 
decision to be discussed tonight, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.,2 written over twenty-five years ago, dealt with the 
difficult issue of what are the duties and conduct of directors in cases 
involving mergers and acquisitions and whether their actions are 
reasonable—a discussion involving many varying factors; and, there is 
no one better equipped to discuss this subject than our speaker tonight. 
It is my great pleasure to introduce the Vice Chancellor of the 
Chancery Court of Delaware—the Honorable J. Travis Laster. 
                                                                                                         
 2. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Powerful imagery from the Revlon decision1 has long influenced 
Delaware’s mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) jurisprudence.  In that 
landmark 1986 opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that when a 
board of directors stops resisting a hostile takeover and decides to sell 
the corporation, the directors’ role changes “from defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for 
the stockholders at a sale of the company.”2  Adding bite to the 
metaphor, the court held that the Revlon directors breached their 
fiduciary duties in selling the corporation for cash to their chosen bidder, 
and the court enjoined the parties from complying with certain aspects 
of the merger agreement.3  Both the language and result of the decision 
suggested the existence of special “Revlon duties,” a set of affirmative 
conduct obligations imposed by the Delaware courts in particular factual 
circumstances that require directors to take certain actions and forgo 
others. 
Nearly thirty years of subsequent judicial development have 
readied this stereotypical interpretation for well-deserved retirement.  
Revlon is now understood to be a form of enhanced scrutiny, the 
innovative standard of review created in Unocal.4  Revlon does not 
establish special duties or impose particular conduct obligations on 
directors.5  Rather, it is a standard of review under which the extent of 
judicial deference given to board decisions narrows from rationality to 
range-of-reasonableness.6 
Although post-millennial Delaware opinions consistently describe 
Revlon as a standard of review, echoes of “Revlon duties” reverberate in 
Delaware law’s nominally disparate treatment of third-party mergers.7  
If the merger consideration consists of cash, then Revlon applies.  If the 
merger consideration takes the form of stock, then Revlon does not 
apply.  But, if the consolidated entity would have a controlling 
                                                                                                         
 1. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
 2. Id. at 182. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 5. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 6. See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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stockholder, then Revlon applies again.8  The divergent treatment stems 
from two well-known Delaware Supreme Court decisions: Time-
Warner9 and QVC.10  Both of these cases involved Paramount 
Communications Corporation, so the resulting patchwork of standards 
appropriately can be labeled the “Paramount doctrine.”11 
Because Revlon is a standard of review, Delaware law no longer 
needs the Paramount doctrine.12  As decisions by the Delaware Supreme 
Court and the Court of Chancery explain, the potential conflicts of 
interest present in a negotiated acquisition provide the impetus for 
applying enhanced Revlon scrutiny.13  Those conflicts exist regardless of 
the form of consideration or whether the post-merger entity would have 
a controlling stockholder.14  Therefore, enhanced scrutiny should apply 
to all negotiated acquisitions, and as a practical matter, it already does.15  
Only the Delaware Supreme Court can get rid of the Paramount 
doctrine, and in my personal view, the high court can and should 
officially bid it farewell. 
                                                                                                         
 8. To simplify the terminology in this Article, “stock-for-stock merger” refers to a 
stock-for-stock transaction in which the surviving company emerges without a 
controlling stockholder, and “Revlon deal” refers to a cash sale or transaction in which 
the surviving company emerges with a controlling stockholder. 
 9. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  Chancellor Allen’s written opinion, which the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed as to result on the Revlon issues, remains equally important. 
See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 700 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 10. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns 
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
 11. By 1995, two Delaware Supreme Court decisions had crystallized the 
Paramount doctrine into a formalistic three-part test for triggering so-called “Revlon 
duties.” See In re Santa Fe Pac. S’holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995); Arnold v. 
Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994).  Although the 
triggering test largely ossified at that point, Revlon praxis continued to evolve. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III. 
 13. See discussion infra Part II. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
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I. FROM UNOCAL TO REVLON 
Until the watershed year of 1985, Delaware recognized only two 
standards of review for evaluating board decisions: the business 
judgment rule16 and the entire fairness test.17  The two doctrines 
reflected a binary world view in which directors fell into one of two 
categories: independent and disinterested directors who made decisions 
that a court would have no cause to second-guess and interested 
directors who made decisions that were inherently suspect. 
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that when 
responding to a takeover bid, target management and the incumbent 
directors face a potential conflict of interest.18  The directors are not 
“interested” in the traditional sense as they would be if they were 
transacting with the corporation.19  However, they are not truly 
disinterested or independent either, because the hostile bid threatens 
their positions with the corporation.20  The resulting structural conflict 
muddies the waters for purposes of judicial review.  If the directors 
resist a hostile bid, they could well be acting in good faith and loyally 
for the commendable purpose of protecting the stockholders’ interests.  
                                                                                                         
 16. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (formulating the business 
judgment rule in its contemporary form); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 
660, 663 (Del. 1952) (citing “the universally acknowledged principle of law which 
leaves many matters to be finally settled by the sound business judgment of the 
directors” but finding that judicial review is required “[w]hen a board acts under a 
misconception of the law on a vital point”); Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 47 A.2d 479, 
486 (Del. 1946) (“If it appears that [the board of directors] acted honestly, they are not 
responsible for mere mistakes, and under such circumstances, Courts will not interfere 
with their action or attempt to assume their authority to act.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) 
(formulating entire fairness test in its contemporary form); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel 
Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109 (Del. 1952) (“Since [the defendant directors] stand on both 
sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness, and it 
must pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 
908 (Del. 1938) (explaining that where directors were interested in the challenged 
transaction, they “assumed the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction”) 
(citing Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921)). 
 18. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 19. See id. at 957. 
 20. See id. 
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Or they could be succumbing to their own self-interest.  Unocal 
famously described this potential conflict as the “omnipresent specter 
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than 
those of the corporation and its shareholders.”21 
To address this concern, Unocal announced a new, intermediate 
standard of review under which the directors bear the burden of showing 
(i) “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy 
and effectiveness existed” and (ii) a response to the danger that was 
“reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”22  The Delaware Supreme 
Court required that the directors satisfy this test to “ensure that a 
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated 
by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its 
stockholders.”23  Enhanced scrutiny—an intermediate standard of 
review—was born. 
One year after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court’s Revlon 
decision applied the new intermediate standard to the sale of a 
corporation.24  Although the high court repeatedly stated that it was 
applying Unocal to the facts of the case, the Revlon opinion had a 
different tone and reached a strikingly different outcome.25  In Unocal, 
the Delaware Supreme Court found for the defendants and praised their 
actions.26  Even though the directors adopted a discriminatory debt-for-
equity exchange offer in response to a hostile bid, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that the defensive response was reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.27  By contrast, in Revlon, the plaintiffs 
won.28  The Delaware Supreme Court criticized the directors’ conduct 
and held that they breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the 
corporation for cash in a premium-generating transaction.29  As a 
remedy, the Delaware Supreme Court enjoined the defendants from 
                                                                                                         
 21. Id. at 954. 
 22. Id. at 955. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
 25. See id. at 180–82. 
 26. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956–57. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. 
 29. See id. 
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proceeding with certain aspects of the merger agreement.30  For those 
who confronted the decisions in real time, the Delaware Supreme Court 
seemed not to have simply applied Unocal, but rather to have done 
something radically different.31 
Doctrinally, at least two aspects of Revlon appeared to depart from 
Unocal.  The first was Revlon’s failure to clearly identify a potential 
conflict.  In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court specifically cited 
entrenchment as the potential conflict and invoked the “omnipresent 
specter” of director self-interest.32  In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme 
Court did not clearly identify a potential conflict, and the fact that the 
directors were selling the company seemed to negate any entrenchment 
motive.33  To the extent that concerns of potential disloyalty animated 
Unocal, similar concerns did not leap off the page in Revlon. 
A second distinguishing factor was Revlon’s prominent language 
that seemed to contemplate affirmative duties for the selling board, 
including a potential duty to auction.34  In the ringing words of the 
                                                                                                         
 30. See id. 
 31. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in 
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 802 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy] (“[F]or many, the differences between Unocal and Revlon loomed 
large.”); Ross W. Wooten, Restructurings During a Hostile Takeover: Directors’ 
Discretion or Shareholders’ Choice?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 505, 519 (1998) (“It is apparent 
that there are two standards . . . .”); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile 
Takeovers: The Impact of QVC and Its Progeny, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 945, 962 (1995) 
(“[T]here is much practical difference between the Unocal and Revlon modes of 
analysis.”). 
 32. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 33. See Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Paramount Rewrites 
the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 158–
65 (1994). 
 34. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 (explaining that “the fiduciary standards 
outlined in Unocal . . . require the directors to determine the best interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders, and impose an enhanced duty to abjure any action that 
is motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern for such interests”); id. at 
182 (stating that “[t]he Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to 
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was 
for sale” and that “[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of 
Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for 
the stockholders’ benefit”); id. at 184 (stating that “[t]he no-shop provision, like the 
lock-up option, while not per se illegal, is impermissible under the Unocal standards 
when a board’s primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the 
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opinion, once the Revlon directors decided to sell the company, they 
became “auctioneers charged with getting the best price.”35  To fully 
appreciate the contemporary effect of this language, recall that just one 
year earlier, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties by selling 
their corporation for cash in a single-bidder process that the court 
deemed inadequate.36  Taken together, Revlon and Van Gorkom seemed 
to tell directors to conduct auctions or else.  It is difficult to imagine a 
more effective way of searing into the minds of deal planners a belief 
that certain situations impose special duties on directors. 
A. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT DRIVING REVLON 
Over the ensuing three decades, the Delaware courts have identified 
the potential conflicts of interest that warrant applying enhanced 
scrutiny in a Revlon scenario: those inherent in the sale of the 
corporation.  Just as Unocal focused on the potential conflicts created by 
a hostile bid,37 Revlon focused on the potential conflicts created by a 
sale.38  The Revlon decision really was applying Unocal, just as the 
Delaware Supreme Court said.39 
Numerous Delaware decisions have explained these conflicts.  In 
the words of the El Paso opinion, “the potential sale of a corporation has 
enormous implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range 
of human motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can 
inspire fiduciaries and their advisers to be less than faithful.”40  The 
Dollar Thrifty case elaborates on this point: 
The heightened scrutiny that applies in the Revlon (and Unocal) 
contexts are, in large measure, rooted in a concern that the board 
                                                                                                         
company to the highest bidder”); id. (“[W]hen bidders make relatively similar offers, or 
dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their 
enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.”); id. (“[T]he 
shareholders’ interests necessitated that the board remain free to negotiate.”). 
 35. Id. at 182. 
 36. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 37. See Unocal, 493 A.2d 946. 
 38. See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173. 
 39. See id. at 180–81. 
 40. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
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might harbor personal motivations in the sale context that differ from 
what is best for the corporation and its stockholders. Most 
traditionally, there is the danger that top corporate managers will 
resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts, or prefer a 
sale to one industry rival rather than another for reasons having more 
to do with personal ego than with what is best for stockholders.41 
Executives may have “an incentive to favor a particular bidder (or type 
of bidder),” especially if “some bidders might desire to retain existing 
management or to provide them with future incentives while others 
might not.”42  Alternatively, managers may seek out a transaction that 
                                                                                                         
 41. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also 
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986) (“No one 
likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or also an officer.”). 
 42. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 194 (Del. Ch. 
2007); see El Paso, 41 A.3d at 445 (noting that a post-sale MBO of certain assets 
“would allow [the CEO] to monetize a large part of his company-specific investment in 
El Paso, while permitting him the chance to continue to participate in managing key 
assets he knew and for another equity pop in the future”); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 692–93 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that target company’s 
top officers bargained for increased severance compensation in anticipation of potential 
sale); Goodwin v. Live Entm’t Inc., No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *19 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that management was “likely to be retained, had discussed 
better contracts, and might obtain such contracts after the merger”); see also Netsmart, 
924 A.2d at 198 (“Rightly or wrongly, strategic buyers might sense that CEOs are more 
interested in doing private equity deals that leave them as CEOs than strategic deals that 
may, and in this case, certainly, would not.”); cf. In re SS & C Techs. Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 911 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to approve disclosure-only 
settlement where record supported inference that CEO “instigated this transaction 
through the use of corporate resources, but without prior authorization from the board 
of directors . . . in order to identify a transaction in which he could both realize a 
substantial cash pay-out for some of his shares and use his remaining shares and options 
to fund a sizeable investment in the resulting entity”).  Private equity buyers are not the 
only acquirers who retain management.  Top executives may well favor those strategic 
buyers who have expressed interest in retaining, or would be more likely to retain, the 
existing team.  A large strategic buyer considering a “bolt-on” acquisition in which 
existing management would continue to operate the business unit might seem more 
attractive and be favored over a smaller strategic acquirer for whom removal of existing 
management would become part of the synergies gained from the deal. See, e.g., In re 
Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., C.A. No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 4, 2011) (requiring disclosure of the fact that CEO would be employed by 
strategic acquirer).  Advisors may have reasons of their own to favor particular buyers, 
categories of buyers, or types of transactions. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders 
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protects their personal wealth at a time when their individual investment 
horizons differ from those of diversified stockholders.43 
The potential conflicts in a sale may involve non-financial 
considerations.  As the RJR Nabisco case explains, 
[g]reed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the 
path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or, as is here 
alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any human emotion may cause a 
director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before 
the welfare of the corporation.44 
In Time-Warner, for example, when evaluating the Time board’s 
deep-seated commitment to its chosen transaction with Warner, 
Chancellor Allen observed that 
[t]here may be at work here a force more subtle than a desire to 
maintain a title or office in order to assure continued salary or 
prerequisites. Many people commit a huge portion of their lives to a 
single large-scale business organization. They derive their identity in 
part from that organization and feel that they contribute to the 
identity of the firm. The mission of the firm is not seen by those 
                                                                                                         
Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 542 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that target’s financial advisor “had an 
incentive to prefer a sale over a liquidation of the company because its fee agreement 
provided it with additional payments for a sale”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199 (noting 
that for the target’s financial advisor, “[t]he path of dealing with a discrete set of private 
equity players was attractive to its primary client contact—management—and the 
quickest (and lowest cost) route to a definitive sales agreement”). 
 43. See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114–15 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(finding CEO nearing retirement was motivated by his desire to secure his nest egg); In 
re Prime Hospitality, Inc., No. Civ.A. 652-N, 2005 WL 1138738, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 
4, 2005) (refusing to approve settlement of stockholder litigation in part because of a 
CEO conflict of interest that made the compromised claims relatively strong). 
 44. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132, 1159 (Del. 
Ch. 1989); see El Paso, 41 A.3d at 439 (“[A] range of human motivations . . . can 
inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than faithful to their contextual duty to 
pursue the best value for the company’s stockholders.”).  See generally Sean J. Griffith, 
Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947 
(2003) [hereinafter Griffith, Last Period] (“Directors and managers may favor one deal 
over another because it is more in line with their self image and view of the world or 
because it is more likely to cause them to be remembered fondly by employees or the 
business press.”). 
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involved with it as wholly economic, nor the continued existence of 
its distinctive identity as a matter of indifference.45 
Consequently, the “paradigmatic context for a good Revlon claim . . . is 
when a supine board under the sway of an overweening CEO bent on a 
certain direction [] tilts the sales process for reasons inimical to the 
stockholders’ desire for the best price.”46  Those inimical reasons may 
be financial, non-financial, or both. 
When the Delaware Supreme Court issued the Revlon opinion, the 
arresting vision of directors transforming into auctioneers overwhelmed 
the references to the conflicts that infected the Revlon directors’ 
decisions.  Subsequent analysis has identified at least two conflicts.  
First, the Delaware Supreme Court was concerned that “Revlon’s CEO, 
Michel Bergerac, rebuffed Pantry Pride’s acquisition overtures in part 
because of the ‘strong personal antipathy’ felt by Bergerac towards 
Pantry Pride’s CEO, Ron Perelman, who was an upstart from Philly and 
not someone whom the Supreme Court believed Bergerac wanted 
running his storied company.”47  Second, the directors appeared fixated 
on obtaining a transaction that would “shor[e] up the sagging market 
value of [recently issued notes] in the face of threatened litigation by 
their holders.”48  Although the note holders were former Revlon 
stockholders who received their notes as part of the board’s initial 
defensive response to Pantry Pride,49 the directors’ continuing concern 
                                                                                                         
 45. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 715 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); accord 
Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co. (In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig.), 926 A.2d 58, 90 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (“[I]t is often the case that founders (and sons of founders) believe that their 
businesses stand for something more than their stock price. Founders therefore often 
care how their family legacy—in the form of a corporate culture that treats workers and 
consumers well, or a commitment to product quality—will fare if the corporation is 
placed under new stewardship.”). 
 46. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holders Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1002 (Del. Ch. 2005); 
see Topps Co., 926 A.2d at 64 (“When directors bias the process against one bidder and 
toward another not in a reasoned effort to maximize advantage for the stockholders, but 
to tilt the process toward the bidder more likely to continue current management, they 
commit a breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
 47. El Paso, 41 A.3d at 439 n.24 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)). 
 48. 506 A.2d at 182. 
 49. See id. at 177. 
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about the note holders carried overtones of self-interest that derived 
from the risk of personal liability and reputational damage.50  The 
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that “under all the circumstances[,] 
the directors allowed considerations other than the maximization of 
shareholder profit to affect their judgment.”51  Confirming that the 
conflicts drove the analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court described 
Revlon three years later as “merely one of an unbroken line of cases that 
seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers 
and acquisitions.”52 
These actual and potential conflicts arise because “a negotiated 
corporate acquisition is a paradigmatic example of a final period 
problem.”53  Economists use this term to refer to a recurring setting in 
which humans struggle with self-interest: 
                                                                                                         
 50. See id. at 184. 
 51. Id. at 185. 
 52. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); see In re 
Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 757 A.2d 1278 
(Del. 2000) (describing Revlon as “an important comment on the need for heightened 
judicial scrutiny when reviewing situations that present unique agency cost problems”); 
W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S’holders 
Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 771 (Del. Ch. 1988) (positing that Revlon is best viewed as a 
duty of loyalty case); In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699, 
722 (Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that Revlon was “essentially a breach of loyalty case in 
which the board was not seen as acting in the good faith pursuit of the shareholders’ 
interests”). 
 53. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 789; accord Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Story of Smith v. Van Gorkom, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 219, 223 
(J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Story of Van Gorkom] 
(“Corporate acquisitions are a classic example of what game theories refer to as ‘final 
period problems.’”); see Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An 
Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 616 (2004) [hereinafter 
Griffith, Precommitment] (“Acquisitions create a last period scenario for target 
managers and directors because the reorganization of the corporate structure following 
the transaction is likely either to end their tenure or, at the very least, significantly 
change their role in the company.”); Griffith, Last Period, supra note 44, at 1945 
(“Although the drama and hyperbole of a bust up acquisition is typically not present in 
the context of a ‘friendly’ merger—after all, the business continues to operate and many 
employees keep their jobs—last period features are still present at the level of the board 
of directors and senior management, many of whom are likely to be in the last period of 
their employment.”); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: 
The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 536 (2002) 
[hereinafter Black & Kraakman, Hidden Value] (“In [negotiated acquisitions], the 
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In a situation where parties expect to have repeated transactions, the 
recognition that a party who cheats in one transaction will be 
penalized by the other party in subsequent transactions reduces the 
incentive to cheat. However, when a transaction is the last (or only) 
in a series—that is, the final period—the incentive to cheat reappears 
because, by definition, the penalty for doing so has disappeared.54 
Similar incentives “are manifest in a number of our commonly held 
intuitions regarding human behavior, including the landlord’s suspicion 
that tenants may skip out on their final month’s rent and the possibility 
that temporary or short term employees may shirk.”55 
When a corporation operates in the ordinary course of business, the 
ability of managers to shirk or self-deal is ordinarily constrained not 
only by legal duties but also by a range of markets, including the 
product markets, capital markets, employment markets, and the market 
for corporate control.56  However, when the manager/stockholder 
relationship enters its final period, market constraints have less bite 
because the target’s shareholders will be bought out by the acquirer. 
Target management is no longer subject to market discipline because 
the target, by definition, will no longer operate in the market as an 
independent agency. As a result, management is less vulnerable to 
both shareholder and market penalties for self-dealing.57 
                                                                                                         
target’s managers and board will likely lose their positions.  They face a strong conflict 
of interest, yet they are in a final period where reputation and fear of future discipline 
lose their force as constraints on self-interested behavior.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 54 (1990) (“A 
friendly merger in which the ownership of a constituent company remains diffuse but 
de facto control shifts from one management team to another, is no less a control shift 
than a transaction that gives rise to a control block . . . . [T]he absence of [a controller] . 
. . does not reduce the danger that [stockholder] interests will suffer under the merger 
terms negotiated by their own management.”). 
 54. Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 720 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
 55. Griffith, Precommitment, supra note 53, at 616. 
 56. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 785 (“Corporate directors 
operate within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute for 
monitoring by residual claimants. A variety of market forces provide important 
constraints. The capital and product markets, the internal and external employment 
markets, and the market for corporate control all constrain shirking by firm agents.”). 
 57. Id. at 789. 
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With typical constraints loosened, the bidder and management may find 
ways to “effectively divert[] a portion of the merger consideration from 
the shareholders to the management team.”58  Available vehicles include 
“an equity stake in the surviving entity, employment or noncompetition 
contracts, substantial severance payments, continuation of existing 
fringe benefits[,] or other compensation arrangements.”59  Even if the 
diverted consideration does not materially decrease the price that the 
bidder would pay to the public stockholders, “side payments may affect 
management’s decision making by causing them to agree to an 
acquisition price lower than that which could be obtained from hard 
bargaining or open bidding.”60 
The final period also “signals a time when otherwise common 
behavioral biases may lead to serious deviations from the welfare of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”61  These include familiar cognitive 
biases such as overconfidence, excessive optimism, groupthink, reactive 
devaluation, and in-group/out-group thinking.62  As Chancellor Allen 
recognized, the human psyche has a powerful ability “to rationalize as 
right that which is merely personally beneficial.”63  Chancellor Chandler 
similarly understood that “[h]uman judgment can be clouded by subtle 
influences like the prestige and perquisites of board membership, 
personal relationships with management, or animosity towards a 
bidder.”64 
The existence of these influences does not mean that managers and 
directors inevitably breach their duties.  Delaware law does not embrace 
“the notion that persons suffering from conflicts are invariably incapable 
of putting them aside,” but it also does not “ignore the reality that 
American business history is littered with examples of managers who 
exploited the opportunity to work both sides of a deal.”65  It is the risk of 
favoritism that provides “good reason to be skeptical of management 
                                                                                                         
 58. Griffith, Last Period, supra note 44, at 1947 (footnotes omitted). 
 59. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 788 (footnotes omitted). 
 60. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 61. Griffith, Last Period, supra note 44, at 1948. 
 62. See id. at 1949–53. 
 63. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 
1988). 
 64. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 65. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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claims to be acting in the shareholders’ best interests.”66  Therefore, a 
negotiated acquisition is one of those “rare situations which mandate 
that a court take a more direct and active role in overseeing the decisions 
made and actions taken by directors.”67  “[T]he resulting need in this 
context to hold the board accountable for its mistakes appropriately 
trumps the usual tendency towards judicial deference to the board’s 
authority.”68 
In short, just like Unocal, Revlon addresses a situation in which 
potential conflicts of interest call for applying greater scrutiny than the 
business judgment rule permits. 
[W]here heightened scrutiny applies, the predicate question of what 
the board’s true motivation was comes into play. The court must take 
a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal interests 
short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board to block a bid 
[Unocal] or to steer a deal to one bidder rather than another 
[Revlon]. Through this examination, the court seeks to assure itself 
that the board acted reasonably, in the sense of taking a logical and 
reasoned approach for the purpose of advancing a proper objective, 
and to thereby smoke out mere pretextual justifications for 
improperly motivated decisions. In this sense, the reasonableness 
standard requires the court to consider for itself whether the board is 
truly well motivated (i.e., is it acting for the proper ends?) before 
ultimately determining whether its means were themselves a 
reasonable way of advancing those ends. As one would expect, when 
the record reveals no basis to question the board’s good faith desire 
to attain the proper end, the court will be more likely to defer to the 
board’s judgment about the means to get there.69 
Revlon applies to negotiated acquisitions because “there is a basis for 
concern that directors without a pure self-dealing motive might be 
influenced by considerations other than the best interests of the 
corporation and other stockholders.”70 
                                                                                                         
 66. Bainbridge, Story of Van Gorkom, supra note 53, at 224. 
 67. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns 
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993). 
 68. Bainbridge, Story of Van Gorkom, supra note 53, at 224. 
 69. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598–600 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 70. Id. at 599 n.181; see QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 & n.9 (contrasting “those rare 
situations which mandate that a court . . . subject[] the directors’ conduct to enhanced 
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B. THE CHIMERA OF REVLON DUTIES 
As noted, although Revlon literally applied the still-new Unocal 
standard of review, language in the opinion suggested affirmative 
conduct obligations for directors.71  Over the ensuing decades, the 
Delaware courts have clarified that Revlon does not impose specific 
conduct requirements.  Revlon instead calls upon a court to determine 
whether the directors’ decisions fell within a “range of 
reasonableness”—precisely the same standard applied under Unocal.72  
Neither decision imposes affirmative conduct obligations.  Both applied 
an intermediate standard of review now recognized as enhanced 
scrutiny. 
The Delaware Supreme Court squarely held in QVC that the 
standard for a Revlon analysis is “range-of-reasonableness,” just like 
Unocal: 
There are many business and financial considerations implicated in 
investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The 
board of directors is the corporate decision-making body best 
equipped to make those judgments. Accordingly, a court applying 
enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors 
made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board 
selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not 
second-guess that choice even though it might have decided 
otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s 
determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their business 
                                                                                                         
scrutiny” with situations where “[a]ctual self-interest is present and affects a majority of 
the directors,” to which entire fairness applies).  See generally Julian Velasco, 
Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 870–83 
(2004). 
 71. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 
A.2d 1361, 1385–86 (Del. 1995) (adopting “range of reasonableness” test for Unocal 
review); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding 
that directors must prove that they selected a response that was “reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed”); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles A. Yablon, 
Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and 
the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. L. 1593, 1605–20 (1994) (describing evolution of 
Delaware cases towards single standard of reasonableness). 
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judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors’ 
decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.73 
The duty to act reasonably requires that a reasonable course of action be 
taken under the circumstances.74  Because there could be several 
reasoned ways to proceed in a situation, “the court cannot find fault so 
long as the directors chose a reasoned course of action.”75 
Consistent with Revlon operating as a reasonableness standard, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there are no specific 
Revlon duties.76  Examining the particular duties that Revlon was once 
thought to impose makes this fact all the more clear. 
1. No Duty to Conduct an Auction or Follow Judicially Prescribed Steps 
Revlon does not create a duty to auction or require that directors 
adhere to judicially prescribed steps to maximize stockholder value.77  
                                                                                                         
 73. 637 A.2d at 45. 
 74. See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 115 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 75. Id.; see QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 (“[A] court subjects the directors’ conduct to 
enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable.”); Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 599 n.181 
(explaining that as a form of enhanced scrutiny, Revlon “requir[es] that the directors 
demonstrate that their decision was well-motivated and was a reasonable way to 
advance the proper interests they must serve, which are the best interests of the 
corporation and the stockholders”). 
 76. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001) (“In our view, 
Revlon neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control context nor 
alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply.”); see also Lyondell Chem. 
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (“[T]here are no legally prescribed steps 
that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.”); QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 (“The 
directors’ fiduciary duties in a sale of control context are those which generally attach. 
In short, ‘the directors must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of care and 
loyalty.’”); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he 
basic teaching of [Revlon and Unocal] is simply that the directors must act in 
accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.”); Mills Acquisition Co. 
v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (“Beyond [seeking the alternative 
offering the best value reasonably available for stockholders], there are no special and 
distinct ‘Revlon duties.’”); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (“‘Revlon duties’ refer only to a director’s performance of his or her duties of 
care, good faith and loyalty in the unique factual circumstance of a sale of control over 
the corporate enterprise.”). 
 77. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“Revlon does not demand that every change in 
the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.”); 
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The Delaware Supreme Court has stated explicitly that “there is no 
single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties[, and a] 
stereotypical approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate control is 
not to be expected.”78  In Dollar Thrifty, the Court of Chancery 
summarized these principles: 
As is well known, Revlon does not require that a board, in 
determining the value-maximizing transaction, follow any specific 
plan or roadmap in meeting its duty to take reasonable steps to 
secure—i.e., actually attain—the best immediate value . . . . Thus, 
although the level of judicial scrutiny under Revlon is more exacting 
than the deferential rationality standard applied to run-of-the-mill 
decisions by the business judgment rule, at bottom Revlon is a test of 
reasonableness: directors are generally free to select the path to value 
maximization, so long as they choose a reasonable route to get 
there.79 
The reviewing court looks at whether the board acted reasonably “by 
undertaking a logically sound process to get the best deal that is 
realistically attainable.”80 
A board acting reasonably can decide to negotiate with a single 
bidder.81  A board faced with competing offers may choose a nominally 
lower bid that provides more certainty of value or poses fewer risks.82  A 
                                                                                                         
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595–96 (describing judicial scrutiny under Revlon); id. at 600 
(“Revlon is often mistakenly referred to as creating a duty to auction.”); In re Netsmart 
Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The mere fact that a 
board did not, for example, do a canvass of all possible acquirers before signing up an 
acquisition agreement does not mean that [the board] necessarily acted unreasonably.”). 
 78. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286; accord Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192 (“This duty, often 
called a Revlon duty, does not, of course, require every board to follow a judicially 
prescribed checklist of sales activities.”). 
 79. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595–96 (footnotes and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 80. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192. 
 81. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286; Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 604. 
 82. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65–68 
(Del. 1989) (finding no breach of duty under either business judgment review or 
enhanced scrutiny where a board rejected potentially higher two-tier offer for an all-
cash bid and holding that board acted reasonably in determining that two-tier bid 
delivered less value because of conditionality); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, 24 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 688, 714–15 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding no breach of duty under enhanced 
scrutiny where board rejected facially higher cash bid and accepted nominally lower 
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board can grant favorable treatment to a particular bidder or class of 
bidders if the board reasonably seeks to promote stockholder interests.83  
If circumstances warrant, a board may reasonably decide not to contact 
“a known interested party who might be willing to offer more.”84 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Lyondell should have 
eliminated any lingering belief that Revlon might impose some form of 
conduct requirement.85  There, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
the Court of Chancery erred by identifying several possible means by 
which the directors could have done more to explore alternatives before 
agreeing to a transaction.86  In the Delaware Supreme Court’s view, the 
Court of Chancery erroneously concluded “that directors must follow 
one of several courses of action to satisfy their Revlon duties.”87  In 
correcting the trial court’s error, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that 
“no court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish [the goal of 
obtaining the best value reasonably available] because they will be 
facing a unique combination of circumstances, many of which will be 
outside their control.”88  And if no court can tell directors what to do 
                                                                                                         
cash bid and holding board acted reasonably in determining that facially higher bid 
delivered less value because of time-value of money, conditionality, and greater risk of 
non-consummation); Norberg v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 358–59 
(Del. Ch. 1989) (refusing to enjoin a management buyout based on speculation that a 
higher offer could be procured); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1132, 1159 (Del. Ch. 1989) (finding that board acted reasonably in choosing 
nominally lower bid over competing management buyout); Freedman v. Rest. Assocs. 
Indus., Inc., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 667 (Del. Ch. 1987) (noting that board may prefer 
a nominally lower bid that has a higher likelihood of closing). 
 83. See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 617 (finding reasonable board’s decision to enter 
into a merger agreement that “set a floor under the market price . . ., left its stockholders 
with the choice of turning down the deal at relatively low cost, and [created] the chance 
to reap more from a bidder . . . who might show up”); In re Fort Howard Corp. 
S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699, 722 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“Revlon explicitly 
recognized that a disinterested board . . . may enter into lock-up agreements if the effect 
was to promote, not to impede shareholder interests.  That can only mean if the 
intended effect is such, for the validity of the agreement itself cannot be made to turn 
upon how accurately the board did foresee the future.”). 
 84. Golden Cycle, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 712. 
 85. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 86. See id. at 242. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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when pursuing a negotiated acquisition, then Revlon cannot impose 
specific conduct requirements. 
2. No Obligation to Retain the Right to Terminate to Take a Better Deal 
Revlon also does not mandate that a board retain the right to 
terminate a merger agreement to take a better deal, nor does it magically 
confer such a right on directors by virtue of their status as fiduciaries.  
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed these issues in Van Gorkom,89 
which “established that Delaware law does not give directors, just 
because they are fiduciaries, the right to accept better offers, distribute 
information to potential new bidders, or change their recommendation 
with respect to a merger agreement even if circumstances have 
changed.”90  The Delaware Supreme Court has never modified or 
overruled Van Gorkom on these points, and it certainly did not do so in 
Revlon, which twice cited Van Gorkom with approval.91  Nor did Revlon 
announce a new, post-Van Gorkom rule: to the contrary, the Delaware 
                                                                                                         
 89. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 90. R. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Deal-Protection Measures and 
the Merger Recommendation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 468–69 (2002) (footnote 
omitted); accord William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the 
Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 654 (2000) (“One of the holdings of 
the Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom was that corporate directors have no 
fiduciary right (as opposed to power) to breach a contract.”) (footnotes omitted); John 
F. Johnston, Recent Amendments to the Merger Sections of the DGCL Will Eliminate 
Some—But Not All—Fiduciary Out Negotiation and Drafting Issues, 1 MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS L. REP. (BNA) No. 20, 777, 778 (1998) (“[T]here is . . . no public policy 
that permits fiduciaries to terminate an otherwise binding agreement because a better 
deal has come along, or circumstances have changed.”); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, 
Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law—When Can Directors Change Their 
Minds?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815, 817 (1997) (“[Van Gorkom] makes it clear that 
under Delaware law there is no implied fiduciary out or trump card permitting a board 
to terminate a merger agreement before it is sent to a stockholder vote.”); John F. 
Johnston & Frederick H. Alexander, Fiduciary Outs and Exclusive Merger 
Agreements—Delaware Law and Practice, 11 INSIGHTS, NO. 2, 15, 15 (1997) (“[T]he 
Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of Delaware corporations may not rely on 
their status as fiduciaries as a basis for (1) terminating a merger agreement due to 
changed circumstances, including a better offer; or (2) negotiating with other bidders in 
order to develop a competing offer.”). 
 91. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179, 185 
(Del. 1986). 
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Supreme Court has held that Revlon’s principles applied retroactively to 
pre-1986 transactions because the Revlon opinion’s holding was 
“derived from fundamental principles of corporate law” and “did not 
produce a seismic shift in the law governing changes of corporate 
control.”92  There are no grounds to distinguish Revlon from Van 
Gorkom based on transaction structure: the Van Gorkom decision 
involved a negotiated cash deal to which Revlon indisputably would 
have applied.93  Indeed, there is now a broad consensus that Van 
Gorkom was not actually a duty-of-care case, but rather the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s initial—albeit unacknowledged—enhanced scrutiny 
case.94 
                                                                                                         
 92. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 n.2 (Del. 1989); accord 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (applying enhanced 
scrutiny under Revlon to a pre-Revlon transaction). 
 93. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868–69 (describing terms of challenged 
merger as acquisition of TransUnion by an entity controlled by the Pritzker family for 
$55 per share in cash). 
 94. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 602 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“Van Gorkom, after all, was really a Revlon case.”) (footnotes omitted); Gagliardi v. 
TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“I count [Van Gorkom] 
not as a ‘negligence’ or due care case involving no loyalty issues but as an early, as of 
its date not yet fully rationalized ‘Revlon’ or ‘change of control’ case.”); see also 
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of 
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom 
and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, n.39 (2002) 
[hereinafter Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard] (“Van Gorkom . . . must 
also be viewed as part of the Delaware courts’ effort to grapple with the huge increase 
in mergers and acquisitions activity in the 1980s and the new problems that posed for 
judicial review of director conduct.”); William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s 
Fiduciary Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 307, 325 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (“In retrospect, [Van Gorkom] can 
be best rationalized not as a standard duty of care case, but as the first case in which the 
Delaware Supreme Court began to work out its new takeover jurisprudence.”); Black & 
Kraakman, Hidden Value, supra note 53, at 522 (“Van Gorkom should be seen not as a 
business judgment rule case but as a takeover case that was the harbinger of the then 
newly emerging Delaware jurisprudence on friendly and hostile takeovers, which 
included the almost contemporaneous Unocal and Revlon decisions.”); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988) 
(“Trans Union is not, at bottom, a business judgment case. It is a takeover case.”); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2002) (interpreting “the oft-maligned decision 
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Under Van Gorkom, “Delaware entities are free to enter into 
binding contracts without a fiduciary out [allowing them to take a better 
offer] so long as there was no breach of fiduciary duty involved when 
entering into the contract in the first place.”95  There is no “Revlon duty” 
that compels a properly informed and motivated board of directors to act 
otherwise. 
3. No Special Duty to Get the Best Price 
Although Delaware decisions conclusively demonstrate that 
enhanced scrutiny does not impose a list of specific “Revlon duties,” 
opinions continue to reference one supposedly overarching “Revlon 
duty”: the duty to get the best price.96  This language is unfortunate 
because it implies that unless enhanced scrutiny applies, directors need 
not seek to maximize stockholder value.97  In my view, however, even 
this is not a “Revlon duty,” because the duty to strive to maximize the 
value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants is the 
universal, loyalty-based standard of conduct that directors of a Delaware 
                                                                                                         
in Smith v. Van Gorkom” as addressing a breakdown in the group decision-making 
process in which the board “blindly relied on Van Gorkom,” thereby enabling Van 
Gorkom to not disclose and the board to not discover “key facts suggesting that the deal 
was not as attractive as it seemed on first look”). 
 95. WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v. Millennium Digital Media Sys., L.L.C., No. 
2993, 2010 WL 3706624, at *17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010); accord Corwin v. DeTrey, 
16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 267, 273 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1989) (“[T]he directors of the selling 
corporation are not free to terminate an otherwise binding merger agreement just 
because they are fiduciaries and circumstances have changed.”). 
 96. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“There is only 
one Revlon duty—to ‘get the best price for the stockholders at the sale of the 
company.’”); see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993) (“In the sale of 
control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the 
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they 
must exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242 (“The duty to seek the best available price 
applies only when a company embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in 
response to an unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”); Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 101 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“It is not until the board 
is under Revlon that its duty ‘narrow[s]’ to getting the best price reasonably available 
for stockholders in a sale of the company.”). 
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corporation always must pursue.  What changes under enhanced scrutiny 
is not the standard of conduct but the standard of review. 
Delaware corporate law is marked by a divergence between 
standards of conduct and standards of review.98  The standard of conduct 
supplies the substantive content for the core fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care: it describes what directors are expected to do.99  The standard 
of review describes what a plaintiff must plead or prove to overcome a 
defendant’s motion and ultimately prevail in the case.100  Courts apply 
the latter to determine whether liability should be imposed, a transaction 
be enjoined, or another equitable remedy be awarded.101  Regardless of 
what standard of review applies, the directors’ standard of conduct does 
not change.  Moreover, in every situation, the standard of review is more 
forgiving of directors and more onerous for stockholder plaintiffs than 
the standard of conduct.102  This divergence is warranted for diverse 
policy reasons typically cited as justifications for the business judgment 
rule.103 
Delaware law imposes two fiduciary duties on directors—the duty 
of care and the duty of loyalty.104  In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Co., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the duty of 
care calls upon directors “to use that amount of care which ordinarily 
                                                                                                         
 98. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 553–58 (2012); Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the 
Standard, supra note 94, at 451–52; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards 
of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 
461–67 (1993). 
 99. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 437. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Velasco, supra note 98, at 521; Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 437. 
 102. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 454. 
 103. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (explaining 
justifications for business judgment rule); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 
1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (same); Velasco, supra note 98, at 54 (explaining similar 
justifications for divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review); 
Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard, supra note 94, at 451–52 (same); 
Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 444 (same). 
 104. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 2008) (“In discharging their 
management function, ‘directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the 
corporation and its shareholders.’”) (footnote omitted). 
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careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”105  So 
stated, the duty of care resembles the obligation to use reasonable care 
that generally prevails in tort.106  This formulation describes the 
standard of conduct.  The standard of review is different.  Depending on 
the situation, the standard of review ranges from gross negligence, to 
reasonableness, to fairness. 
The duty of loyalty exhibits similar divergence.  In Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court articulated a strict standard that 
would seem to prohibit any conflict of interest.107  But again, this is the 
standard of conduct.  The standard of review ranges from a threshold 
determination of materiality, to reasonableness, to fairness. 
A subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty is the requirement that 
directors act in good faith.108  The eBay decision teaches that when 
managing a corporation, directors must seek “to promote the value of 
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”109  “[A] corporation 
may take steps, such as giving charitable contributions or paying higher 
wages, that do not maximize profits currently . . . because such activities 
are rationalized as producing greater profits over the long-term.”110  
Decisions of this nature benefit the corporation as a whole, and by 
                                                                                                         
 105. 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).  As part of this obligation, “directors have a 
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material 
information reasonably available to them.  Having become so informed, they must then 
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 
(Del. 2000). 
 106. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 439 (describing the standard of conduct as simply 
“a special case of the duty of care imposed throughout the law . . . . [I]f a person 
assumes a role whose performance involves the risk of injury to others, he is under a 
duty to perform that role carefully . . . .”). 
 107. 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939); see also Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary 
Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1240 (2010) (discussing 
Guth). 
 108. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 109. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); 
accord Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.”). 
 110. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Firms 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.34 (2012) [hereinafter Strine, For-
Profit Firms]. 
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increasing the value of the corporation, the directors increase the share 
of the corporation’s value beneficially owned by and available for the 
residual claimants.111  Accordingly, Delaware decisions commonly refer 
to directors owing fiduciary duties “to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”112  This formulation captures the intuition that directors 
owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the residual 
claimants.113  “[S]tockholders’ best interest must always, within legal 
limits, be the end.  Other constituencies may be considered only 
instrumentally to advance that end.”114 
As Henry Ford and the founder of craigslist learned, directors who 
concededly act to benefit constituencies other than the stockholders 
without explaining the instrumental rationale for doing so breach their 
duty of good faith because they have admitted violating the applicable 
standard of conduct.115  Similarly, special committee members have 
                                                                                                         
 111. Id. at 147–48. 
 112. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
99 (Del. 2007); accord Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“The directors 
of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders 
but also to the corporations upon whose boards they serve.”); Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (“Our starting point is the 
fundamental principle of Delaware law that the business and affairs of a corporation are 
managed by or under the direction of its board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141(a) (2013). In exercising these powers, directors are charged with an unyielding 
fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests 
of its shareholders.”); TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 
1183 (Del. Ch. 1989) (describing as “non-controversial” the proposition that “the 
interests of the shareholders as a class are seen as congruent with those of the 
corporation in the long run”). 
 113. See Strine, For-Profit Firms, supra note 110, at 147–48. 
 114. See id. at 147 n.34. 
 115. This statement assumes that the certificate of incorporation has not modified 
the directors’ managerial authority and concomitant duties. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such 
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or 
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to 
such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of 
incorporation.”) (emphasis added).  The language of Section 141(a) indicates that while 
the duty of loyalty cannot be eliminated, it could be expanded or redirected to include 
additional or different beneficiaries. Consequently, the principle that corporations must 
 
2013] REVLON IS A STANDARD OF REVIEW: 29 
                        WHY IT’S TRUE AND WHAT IT MEANS 
been found to have fallen short in challenges to transactions governed 
by entire fairness when the directors did not understand that their job 
was not to merely accept a fair transaction, but rather to seek the best 
transaction available for the minority stockholders and strive for “the 
highest possible price.”116 
Absent an intentional or unwitting admission, the standard of 
review for good faith once again diverges dramatically from the 
standard of conduct.  When the business judgment rule applies, a 
reviewing court does not look closely at the motivations of the 
directors.117 
[B]ecause the board is disinterested and thus has no apparent motive 
to do anything other than act in the best interest of the corporation 
and its stockholders[,] . . . the court merely looks to see whether the 
business decision made was rational in the sense of being one logical 
approach to advancing the corporation’s objectives.118 
                                                                                                         
be operated for the benefit of the common stockholders is likely itself a default rule that 
the parties to the corporate contract can modify. See id.; see also id. § 102(b)(1) 
(authorizing the charter to contain “[a]ny provision for the management of the business 
and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, 
defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the 
stockholders . . . if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State”).  
“[S]hareholders are not inherently privileged relative to other corporate constituents. 
Instead, as with the rights of other corporate constituents, the rights of shareholders are 
established through bargaining, even though the form of the bargain is a take-it-or-
leave-it standard form contract provided off-the-rack by the default rules of corporate 
law and the corporation’s organic documents.” Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra 
note 31, at 777. 
 116. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holder Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 870, 881 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that special negotiating committee members who 
understood their obligation was only to determine fairness and not the maximization of 
stockholder value had an “an imperfect appreciation of the proper scope and purpose of 
such a special committee”); see In re First Bos., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10338, 1990 
WL 78836, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1990) (explaining that directors who serve on a 
special committee to evaluate an interested transaction are expected “to approve only a 
transaction that is in the best interests of the public shareholders, [and] to say no to any 
transaction that is not fair to those shareholders and is not the best transaction 
available”). 
 117. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 118. Id.; see also Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323–24 (Del. Ch. 1979); 
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Co., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924).  See generally 
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A court will infer bad faith and a violation of the duty of loyalty only 
when a decision lacks any rationally conceivable basis for benefitting 
stockholders.119 
However, when a Delaware court applies enhanced scrutiny, the 
metric for fiduciary duty review is range of reasonableness: 
What is important and different about the Revlon [enhanced 
scrutiny] standard is the intensity of judicial review that is applied to 
the directors’ conduct. Unlike the bare rationality standard 
applicable to garden-variety decisions subject to the business 
judgment rule, the Revlon standard contemplates a judicial 
examination of the reasonableness of the board’s decision-making 
process. Although linguistically not obvious, this reasonableness 
review is more searching than rationality review, and there is less 
tolerance for slack by the directors.120 
                                                                                                         
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 778 (“While the law clearly establishes 
shareholder wealth maximization as one of the default contractual rights of 
shareholders, the business judgment rule effectively precludes courts from reviewing 
corporate decisions that allegedly further interests other than that of shareholder wealth 
maximization.”) (footnote omitted); Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard, 
supra note 94, at 452 (“[T]he business judgment review standard (‘rationality’) 
diverges from, and becomes more lenient than, the normative standard of conduct 
(‘reasonableness’).”) (footnote omitted). 
 119. See Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard, supra note 94, at 453 
(defining an irrational decision as “one that is so blatantly imprudent that it is 
inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally informed person could 
have made it”); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality 
is the outer limit of the business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional 
equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good 
faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.”).  The two possibilities 
identified in Brehm are synonymous, because waste is defined as a transaction “so one 
sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration,” i.e. no one could have reached such a 
conclusion in good faith. Id. at 263; see also White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553–55 
(Del. 2001); W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 
Inc. S’holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“A court may, however, 
review the substance of a business decision made by an apparently well motivated 
board for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the 
bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground 
other than bad faith.”). 
 120. In re Netsmart Techs. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
accord Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 596 n.170 (quoting Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192); In re 
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In other words, when enhanced scrutiny applies, directors must provide 
reasonable grounds to believe they acted in good faith. 
If the standard of review increases to entire fairness, the range of 
deference narrows to intrinsic fairness, and directors must prove their 
good faith as part of that standard.121  What does not change regardless 
of the standard of review is the underlying standard of conduct, which 
requires that directors strive to maximize the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of the corporation’s residual claimants, viz, its stockholders.  
The duty of loyalty always imposes that core fiduciary obligation.122 
In Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court 
noted that Revlon “did not produce a seismic shift in the law governing 
changes of corporate control.”123  Revlon’s holding instead follows 
logically from the duty of loyalty that requires fiduciaries to strive to 
maximize value when selling assets held for their beneficiaries.124  
                                                                                                         
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[In Revlon,] 
the Supreme Court held that courts would subject directors subject to . . . a heightened 
standard of reasonableness review, rather than the laxer standard of rationality review 
applicable under the business judgment rule.”). 
 121. Evidence of bad faith can be sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule. See 
Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006) 
(“Our law clearly permits a judicial assessment of director good faith for that former 
purpose [of rebutting the business judgment rule].”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 40 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Under Delaware law, when a plaintiff 
demonstrates the directors made a challenged decision in bad faith, the plaintiff rebuts 
the business judgment rule presumption, and the burden shifts to the directors to prove 
that the decision was entirely fair to the corporation and its stockholders.”); In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760–79 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 
27, 50 (Del. 2006) (addressing whether board of directors breached its duties in 
connection with termination of corporation’s president). 
 122. Freedman v. Rest. Assocs. Indus., Inc., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 
1987); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 741 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (“Revlon 
was not a radical departure from existing law (i.e., it has ‘always’ been the case that 
when a trustee or other fiduciary sells an asset for cash, his duty is to seek the single 
goal of getting the best available price) . . . .”); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. 
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“Revlon . . . can be seen as an 
application of traditional Delaware law: a fiduciary cannot sell for less when more is 
available on similar terms.”). 
 123. 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 n.2 (Del. 1989). 
 124. Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1000 (noting that the obligation to maximize 
stockholder value “is rooted in old trust principles and is mundane to those who believe 
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Trustees who undertake to sell the res have always been expected to 
strive to maximize value.125  This obligation translates into the law of 
corporations when directors sitting in a fiduciary relationship with 
stockholders seek to sell corporate assets or the corporation as whole.126 
The bedrock principle that a board owes a duty to shareholders to act 
only in pursuit of their interests is the principle that explains Revlon. 
Where the company is to be sold, it cannot be in conformity with 
that obligation to defeat a higher offer in favor of a lower one 
regardless of other considerations. So understood, Revlon is 
consistent with a very long line of cases.127 
Consequently, “Revlon was not a radical departure from existing law 
(i.e., it has ‘always’ been the case that when a trustee or other fiduciary 
sells an asset for cash, his duty is to seek the single goal of getting the 
best available price).”128 
Given these principles, it is incorrect, in my view, to say that the 
duty to strive to maximize value is a “Revlon duty.”  It is also 
misleading because it would suggest that if enhanced scrutiny did not 
apply, directors would not need to strive to maximize value.  In reality, 
the core value-maximizing duty does not arise only when enhanced 
scrutiny is the standard of review.  It always exists.  What changes is 
                                                                                                         
that stockholders are the only corporate constituency whose best interests are an end, 
rather than an instrument, of the corporate form”). 
 125. See id.; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection 
Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 927 n.25 (2001) 
[hereinafter Strine, Categorical Confusion] (stating that the “Revlon principle grows out 
of the traditional principle that fiduciaries must sell trust assets for their highest value” 
and citing Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441, 448 (Del. 1964), and 
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924), as demonstrating 
that principle). 
 126. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993) (citing Wilmington Trust 
Co., 200 A.2d 441, a trust case, as one of the sources of the directors’ duty to seek the 
best transaction available for stockholders). 
 127. Freedman, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 661; see also City Capital Assocs. Ltd. 
P’ship, 551 A.2d at 802 (“Revlon . . . can be seen as an application of traditional 
Delaware law: a fiduciary cannot sell for less when more is available on similar 
terms.”). 
 128. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 741 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
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that a court looks to whether the directors acted reasonably in support of 
this goal, rather than merely whether their conduct was rational.  
Enhanced scrutiny is a standard of review, and there are no so-called 
“Revlon duties.” 
II. ENHANCED SCRUTINY LOGICALLY APPLIES TO PURE STOCK-FOR-
STOCK DEALS 
Enhanced scrutiny is thus a standard of review that applies to 
negotiated acquisitions because of concerns about potential conflicts.  
Recognizing this fact has at least one major implication: enhanced 
scrutiny should apply to all negotiated acquisitions.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court therefore can and should retire the Paramount doctrine. 
A. CONCERN ABOUT CONFLICTS 
Conflicts are not unique to Revlon deals.  The CEO and members 
of management can be retained or replaced by the acquirer after either a 
Revlon deal or a stock-for-stock deal.129  Directors and executives may 
receive transaction-related compensation or other employment benefits 
in a Revlon deal or a stock-for-stock deal.130  A board and its 
                                                                                                         
 129. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 294 (3d ed. 2011) (citing empirical evidence that 50% of top executives 
leave their employment within three years of a change of control); James F. Cotter & 
Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process, 35 J. FIN. 
ECON. 63, 88–94 (1994) (finding empirical support for proposition that managers resist 
tender offers out of self-interest); Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate 
Performance, Corporate Takeovers and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 677 
(1991) (“The dramatic increase in the turnover rate of top managers following 
takeovers . . . indicates that takeovers are an important device for altering the top 
management of target firms.”); James P. Walsh, Top Management Turnover Following 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2 (citing empirical evidence that 
management turnover in acquired or merged firms was higher than standalone firms 
over one, two, three, four, and five year periods); Jay C. Hartzell, et al., What’s In It for 
Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 37–61 (2004) (citing 
empirical evidence that target CEOs are infrequently retained and that turnover for 
target CEOs is significantly higher than CEOs of standalone companies; and reviewing 
extensive literature yielding consistent results). 
 130. Chancellor Chandler commented on the irony of a transaction that is not a 
“change-in-control” for purposes of QVC nevertheless triggering change-in-control 
benefits when ruling on litigation challenging the board of Caremark RX, Inc.’s 
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management could be just as enchanted or disenchanted with the 
idiosyncrasies of a particular acquirer in a stock-for-stock deal as in a 
Revlon deal.  Indeed, management interests may loom largest in mergers 
of equals, where “social issues,” like CEO-succession and board 
composition, frequently rank among the most critical and heavily 
negotiated aspects of the transaction.131  As then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
                                                                                                         
decision to proceed with its stock-for-stock merger with CVS Corporation in the face of 
a competing bid by Express Scripts, Inc.: 
Even defendants such as Crawford, who will retain substantial authority as Chairman 
[after the merger], benefit from this “change of control” acceleration of their options. 
Defendants insist that this “merger of equals” does not, however, constitute a 
corporate change of control for purposes of this Court’s jurisprudence under Revlon . . 
. . This brings to mind Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, who made a similar assertion 
when he claimed that “[w]hen I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to 
mean—neither more nor less.” 
La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1180 n.6 (Del. Ch. 
2007).  He regarded the Caremark directors’ position as having “a very Through the 
Looking Glass feel to it.” Id.  While recognizing that “words may change in legal 
significance depending upon their context,” he nevertheless found it “an unfortunate 
and disappointing spectacle” for “a board of directors [to] insist that it simultaneously 
deserves the protection of the business judgment rule because the company is not 
changing hands, while a massive personal windfall is bestowed because it is.” Id.  In 
Crawford, the Caremark directors also faced an additional subtle conflict, also 
applicable regardless of the form of consideration: the existing merger agreement, 
unlike a competing proposal, provided for broad third-party indemnification that could 
extend to claims against directors for backdating stock options, which implicated the 
duty of loyalty and raised questions about their good faith. Id. at 1189–90. 
 131. Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 
“Mergers of Equals,” 20 J. LAW & ECON. 60, 96 (2004) (citing empirical evidence 
suggesting that target CEOs negotiate shared control in mergers in exchange for lower 
deal premiums); Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 931 (“Is it not the 
case that issues relating to managerial and board positions frequently dominate the 
discussions?”); John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: 
How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 858–59 & n.107 
(1999) (noting that in most friendly deals the “managers and directors of the target 
company will lose control over the future of the organization”); see also ROBERT E. 
SPATT & ARIANA S. COOPER, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, SOCIAL ISSUES IN 
SELECTED RECENT MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS TRANSACTIONS 2004 – 2012 
SUPPLEMENT (2012) (cataloguing the results of board and management negotiations 
over control and governance of merged companies); Buhui Qiu & Fadi Yakoub, Do 
Target CEOs Trade Premiums for Personal Benefits? Evidence from the Last Two 
Merger Waves (Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://business.uc.edu/content/dam/business/departments/finance/docs/CEO%20Retenti
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rhetorically asked in 2001, “[i]s it really the case that the directors and 
managers are less likely to be acting to preserve their positions in a non-
Revlon transaction?”132  Put simply, if potential conflicts drive enhanced 
scrutiny, then enhanced scrutiny should apply to negotiated acquisitions, 
regardless of the form of consideration. 
B. CONCERN ABOUT DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
When defensive measures are used to insulate a transaction, the 
reduction in market oversight accentuates the risk that the transaction 
may have been infected by self-interest.133  Defensive measures are just 
as much of an issue in stock-for-stock deals as in Revlon deals.134 
Stock-for-stock transactions regularly incorporate a suite of 
defensive measures that practitioners and even Delaware decisions have 
started to refer to as “standard merger terms.”135  This package includes 
                                                                                                         
on%20and%20Severance%20Pay%2008182011-full%20copy.pdf (citing empirical 
evidence suggesting that CEOs trade severance payments for deal premium). 
 132. Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 930. 
 133. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 444–45 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(observing that the loyalty issues raised by concealed motives and financial interests of 
CEO and financial adviser led to negotiation failures that were “compounded by a deal 
protection package that (1) precluded termination of the Merger Agreement if a 
favorable bid for the E&P business emerged; and (2) made it very expensive for a 
bidder for the pipeline business to make an offer because of the $650 million 
termination fee and Kinder Morgan’s matching rights”); Griffith, Last Period, supra 
note 44, at 1947 (“If the management team is able to protect the self-serving transaction 
with deal protection provisions, it will be further insulated from the disciplinary effect 
of the market for corporate control, leaving the outgoing management team free to 
serve their own self-interest with relative impunity.”). 
 134. Although this Article argues only for the doctrinal equivalence of Revlon deals 
and stock-for-stock deals, an article by then-Vice Chancellor Strine went a step further 
and analogized stock-for-stock transactions to interested transactions. See Strine, 
Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 939 (“Because of the importance of the 
merger transactions and their profound effect on management’s future, deal protection 
measures that protect management’s favored deal tend to give a stock-for-stock merger 
agreement the flavor of an interested transaction.”). 
 135. In re 3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
18, 2009); accord In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., No. 6124, 2011 WL 864928, at *7 
n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (quoting 3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7); see also In re 
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 261, 21 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (referring to deal protections as “standard in form”); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, 
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a no-shop clause, restrictions on the board’s ability to provide 
information in response to a competing bid, a matching right and other 
restrictions on the board’s ability to terminate the agreement to accept a 
competing bid, a healthy termination fee (with or without separate 
expense reimbursement), and support agreements from significant 
stockholders.136  If defensive measures can be problematic in Revlon 
deals because they insulate management’s chosen transaction, then they 
are equally problematic in stock-for-stock deals. 
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that enhanced scrutiny 
applies to the defensive measures used to protect a stock-for-stock 
deal.137  In doing so, the court recognized the existence of potential 
                                                                                                         
Inc. S’holders Litig., 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311, 13 (Del. Ch. 2013) (observing that 
combination of no-shop, match rights, termination fee, and force-the-vote provision has 
“routinely been upheld”).  But see In re Compellent Techs. Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 
6084, 2011 WL 6382523, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (“M & A practitioners have 
developed a taxonomy of familiar provisions that frequently appear in merger 
agreements, such as no-shop clauses, information rights, matching rights, and 
termination fees. Embracing these generic terms, the defendants have listed the types of 
provisions found in the Original Merger Agreement and labeled them ‘customary.’ But 
to identify defensive measures by type without referring to their details ignores the 
spectrum of forms in which deal protections can appear.”); Crawford, 918 A.2d at 1181 
n.10 (disagreeing that deal protections should be rubber-stamped as “customary”). 
 136. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012 STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS DEAL POINTS STUDY (2012) (detailing the use of deal protections, 
including no-shops, no-talks, match rights, and breakup fees, in cash or stock 
transactions over $100 million announced in 2011); see also ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re 
Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 97–99, 108 (Del. Ch. 1999) (describing defensive measures in 
merger agreement governing all-stock transaction; and observing the practice of 
“imbed[ding] provisions in stock-for-stock mergers that are intentionally designed to 
prevent another bidder, through a tender offer or rival stock-for-stock bid, from 
preventing the consummation of a transaction”). 
 137. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003) 
(reaffirming the position that “defensive devices . . . must withstand enhanced judicial 
scrutiny under the Unocal standard of review, even when that merger transaction does 
not result in a change of control”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time 
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989) (“structural safety devices” in a 
merger agreement “are properly subject to a Unocal analysis”); accord McMillan v. 
Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Under a ‘duck’ approach to 
the law, ‘deal protection’ terms self-evidently designed to deter and make more 
expensive alternative transactions would be considered defensive and reviewed under 
the [Unocal] standard.”).  See generally Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125 
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conflicts sufficient to justify enhanced scrutiny.138  If those conflicts are 
sufficiently present to warrant reasonableness review of the defensive 
measures, the same conflicts should be sufficiently present to warrant 
reasonableness review of the transaction as a whole, thereby dispensing 
with the Paramount doctrine. 
C. THE LOGIC OF QVC 
The logic of QVC itself supports eliminating the Paramount 
doctrine and applying enhanced scrutiny more broadly to all negotiated 
acquisitions.  Carried to their logical conclusion, the principles on which 
the Delaware Supreme Court relied to justify applying enhanced 
scrutiny to the Paramount-Viacom combination militate in favor of 
extending enhanced scrutiny to all stock-for-stock deals. 
According to QVC, whether the post-transaction entity will have a 
controlling stockholder makes a difference for the standard of review 
because of the resulting loss in voting power inflicted on target 
stockholders.139  Without procedural protections, “stockholder votes are 
likely to become mere formalities.”140  Among other things, “minority 
stockholders can be deprived of a continuing equity interest in their 
corporation by means of a cash-out merger.”141  Having described these 
potential consequences, the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC quickly 
jumped to the concept of a control premium: 
The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privilege of 
exerting the powers of majority ownership come at a price. That 
price is usually a control premium which recognizes not only the 
                                                                                                         
(arguing for Unocal review of defensive measures in stock-for-stock merger 
agreements). 
 138. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 928. 
 139. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns 
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993) (“When a majority of a corporation’s 
voting shares are acquired by a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting 
together, there is a significant diminution in the voting power of those who thereby 
become minority stockholders.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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value of a control block of shares, but also compensates the minority 
stockholders for their resulting loss of voting power.142 
On the facts before it, the court held that “[b]ecause of the intended sale 
of control, the Paramount–Viacom transaction has economic 
consequences of considerable significance to the Paramount 
stockholders.”143  A principal consequence was that once control shifted, 
“the current Paramount stockholders [would] have no leverage in the 
future to demand another control premium.”144  Therefore, the 
Paramount directors “had an obligation to take the maximum advantage 
of the current opportunity to realize for the stockholders the best value 
reasonably available.”145 
Restated in less lofty language, the QVC court applied enhanced 
scrutiny because the Paramount-Viacom merger presented a one-time 
opportunity to obtain value, and the Paramount board needed to go out 
and get everything that it could.146  These propositions are equally true 
for stock-for-stock deals. 
                                                                                                         
 142. Id. at 43. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. A strong argument can be made that QVC’s change-of-control rationale does 
not justify elevating the standard of review because many decisions that boards make 
have “economic consequences of considerable significance” for stockholders. Id.  
Respect for board decision-making is generally not undermined by the magnitude of the 
decision. See Regan, supra note 33, at 129 (“[T]he undisputed significance of a change-
of-control transaction is, without more, an insufficient doctrinal basis to displace the 
deference otherwise accorded to decisions made in good faith by informed and 
disinterested directors, even in the context of a corporate takeover.”).  What should be 
required to elevate the standard of review is some form of actual or threatened conflict 
that undermines the legal system’s confidence in the fiduciaries’ decisions.  A potential 
loss of voting power has significance, but significance does not necessarily mean 
conflict, which arises from the divergent interests endemic to negotiated acquisitions 
when managers and directors are (or perceive that they could be) in their final period.  
The fact that the post-transaction entity would have a controlling stockholder 
accentuates the final period problem because after the deal closes, the controller has 
greater flexibility to restructure the entity at will.  To protect against the uncertainty this 
creates, managers may be more inclined to bargain in their own interests rather than 
those of the stockholders.  However, this is a matter of degree, not a difference in kind, 
because every negotiated acquisition gives rise to the final period problem.  Without the 
taint of conflict, the change-in-control rationale is insufficient to support enhanced 
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Although QVC accurately observed that the corollary of a change-
of-control is usually some type of control premium, that is one of the 
many instances in which correlation does not equate to causation.147  
The potential for a change-in-control by itself does not confer value on 
stockholders.  For example, in a creeping acquisition, the acquirer builds 
a controlling position without the board or other stockholders taking 
notice.148  In a street sweep, the buyer quickly accumulates a large or 
controlling position before the board or other stockholders can react.149  
In both cases, the acquirer strives to avoid paying any control premium, 
or at a minimum to avoid paying the premium for as many shares as 
possible.  That proposition can be generalized for rational acquirers: in 
any acquisition, an acquirer will prefer to pay the lowest possible price 
(and premium).150 
Negotiated acquisitions are bargaining situations.  Value is not 
conferred charitably on sell-side stockholders; it must be extracted.  If 
                                                                                                         
scrutiny.  Once the role of conflict is recognized, the change-in-control rationale is no 
longer necessary. 
 147. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43. 
 148. See, e.g., Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 313 (Del. 
Ch. 2010), aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (finding adoption of rights plan was 
reasonable response to threat of creeping acquisition); NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica 
Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing possible responses to alleged creeping 
acquisition by hedge fund); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Fertita, No. 4339, 2009 
WL 2263406, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2009) (declining to dismiss claim that board 
breached its fiduciary duties by failing to employ a rights plan to block a creeping 
acquisition attempt, when considered “together with other suspect conduct”). 
 149. Cf. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del. 
1987) (approving reasonableness of board’s facilitation of street sweep by friendly 
investor). 
 150. See In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1443, 1459 
(Del. Ch. 1990) (“A bidder’s objective is to identify an underpriced corporation and to 
acquire it at the lowest price possible. It is a straightforward investment decision. When 
the bidder, as in the typical situation, owes no direct duty to stockholders, it has no 
obvious reason to try to ‘maximize shareholder value.’ Indeed, its interest, if successful, 
will minimize shareholder value.”); accord Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design 
Sys., Inc., 789 A.2d 1216, 1227 (Del. Ch. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Mentor Graphics Corp. 
v. Shapiro, 818 A.2d 959 (Del. 2003) (“The Dunkin’ Donuts Court recognized the 
reality that bidders have economic interests that are inherently and structurally in 
conflict with the target company’s stockholders’ interest in receiving maximum 
available value. A bidder for control, like any rational buyer, wants (and has a fiduciary 
duty to its own investors) to acquire the target company as cheaply as possible.”). 
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an acquirer expects a transaction to generate synergies, the acquirer 
should be willing to share a portion of the synergies with the target as 
the price of getting the deal done and achieving the remaining gains.  In 
a cash deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a higher dollar figure.  In 
a stock deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a larger share of the 
post-transaction entity.  In either case, the gains are allocated through 
negotiation. 
The same is true for the control premium.  Scholars have debated 
the reasons why an acquirer would pay a premium to purchase 
control.151  For purposes of the negotiation principle, the source of the 
control premium does not matter.  Regardless of its origins, the value of 
control is something that the acquirer would prefer to keep rather than 
share.  The acquirer will share a portion of this value only if it is 
extracted through negotiation.  In a negotiated acquisition, the sell-side 
fiduciaries act as bargaining agents for disaggregated stockholders.152  
When sell-side fiduciaries obtain a premium for their stockholders, it 
reflects their success in extracting a portion of the combinatorial value. 
Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh has documented that sell-side 
fiduciaries routinely bargain for premiums in pure stock-for-stock 
transactions.153  This unsurprising finding demonstrates that even when 
                                                                                                         
 151. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of 
Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 (2005) (discussing varying 
theories for source of control premium and their legal implications); Richard A. Booth, 
Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 
127 (2001) (same); John C. Coates, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate 
Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1999) 
(same). 
 152. See Brian J.M. Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 865, 878 (2007) (“Negotiated acquisitions are, in principle, bargaining 
problems. Bargaining over price represents a division of the economic surplus between 
the buyer and the seller.”) (footnote omitted); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for 
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1045 (1982) 
(“Premiums are raised in unfriendly takeovers in which management actually seeks 
competing offers, and in negotiated acquisitions in which management . . . bargain[s] 
for increased premiums.”). 
 153. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some 
Consequences in the Law of Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 886 (2003) 
(reporting a mean premium from 1999-2002 of 30% of stock-for-stock mergers versus 
36% in cash acquisitions and a median premium of 28.26% for stock-for-stock mergers, 
essentially identical to the median of 28.07% in cash acquisitions). 
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ownership of a post-merger entity will remain in a “large, fluid, 
changeable and changing market,”154 the merger negotiation creates a 
unique opportunity to extract a share of the combinatorial value.  
Moreover, the opportunity to extract value through a particular 
negotiation is, by definition, unique to that negotiation.  For humans, 
time only runs one way.  Once the negotiation is over and the deal 
completed, the value exchanged in that negotiation cannot be 
reallocated. 
Readers of QVC often seem fixated on the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s comment that “[o]nce control has shifted, the current Paramount 
stockholders will have no leverage in the future to demand another 
control premium,” inferring that if a future control premium could be 
available, then enhanced scrutiny should not apply.155  This is a logical 
fallacy.  The statement that enhanced scrutiny will apply if no future 
control premium is available does not imply that enhanced scrutiny will 
not apply if a future control premium is available, any more than the 
statement that coffee will be available if you arrive by 1:00 p.m. implies 
that coffee will not be available if you arrive after 1:00 p.m.  Coffee may 
be available if you arrive after 1:00 p.m.  You are just not guaranteed to 
get it.156 
Regardless, there is no corporate law limit of one premium per 
stockholder.  The control premium that could be extracted in a future 
deal is just that—a share of the combinatorial value of the future deal.  It 
represents a separate and distinct negotiating opportunity for the future 
board that is neither exclusive of nor co-extensive with the present 
negotiating opportunity.  Even if the stockholders of the merged 
company may someday have an opportunity to have their future 
fiduciaries extract a control premium on their behalf as part of a future 
transaction, the exchange ratio fixed in the current stock-for-stock 
merger would determine the post-merger ownership of the firm.  The 
stock-for-stock merger therefore represents the only time when the 
selling stockholders of the acquired corporation can extract a premium 
                                                                                                         
 154. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns 
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. 
Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 739 (Del. Ch. 
1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)). 
 155. Id. at 43. 
 156. This is simply a matter of propositional logic. 
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from the buyer as the price of acquiring their current entity, because 
their resulting ownership stake determines how much of any aggregate 
future control premium the stockholders of the acquired corporation 
receive. 
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine made these same points in a 2001 
article, in which he posited a stock-for-stock merger between two 
corporations—Zuckerman and Angstrom—in which Zuckerman 
stockholders would receive Angstrom shares.  He explained that 
regardless of whether the consideration was stock or cash, “the 
Zuckerman stockholders arguably face[d] their last real chance to get 
full value for the company.”157  Although the consolidated entity might 
later be sold for a control premium, 
[i]n the real world, this theoretical reality would provide little solace 
to the Zuckerman stockholders. They would rightly be worried about 
whether the current merger represented an unfair transfer of wealth 
from the Zuckerman stockholders to the Angstrom stockholders. 
That is, the fairness of the exchange ratio would be critical to the 
Zuckerman stockholder because it fixes their claim on the assets of 
the combined entity—and thus their share of any future control 
premium. Put differently, the merger will be their final opportunity 
to be afforded payment for their now exclusive ownership of 
Zuckerman.158 
Exactly. 
A board negotiating a pure stock-for-stock merger is therefore in a 
position analogous to the Paramount board in QVC in both respects that 
the Delaware Supreme Court found critical: (i) the merger negotiation 
provides an opportunity to extract for the stockholders a share of 
combinatorial value that the acquirer otherwise would prefer to keep, 
and (ii) the opportunity is a one-time chance to obtain this value that 
will not recur, even if the combined corporation can later be sold.159  
Because these basic realities were deemed sufficient to impose enhanced 
                                                                                                         
 157. Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 929–30. 
 158. Id. at 930. 
 159. See generally QVC, 637 A.2d 34. 
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scrutiny in QVC, they should be sufficient for stock-for-stock deals 
generally.160 
D. DECISIONS INVOLVING MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES 
The Paramount doctrine also should be abandoned because it fails 
to accommodate the reality that boards routinely confront a range of 
strategic alternatives.  One choice typically will be to go it alone.  
Another may be to sell for cash.  Yet another may be a recapitalization 
in which a new investor will take a controlling equity stake.  Still others 
could involve stock-for-stock mergers with acquirers who may or may 
not have controlling stockholders.  And perhaps one of the potential 
bidders will turn hostile.  In my experience, unhampered by the current 
formalism of Delaware law, directors typically ask the right question: 
which of the alternatives provides the best risk-adjusted value for the 
stockholders.  But when lawyers steeped in the Paramount doctrine 
enter the picture, they advise the directors that the different alternatives 
are subject to different standards of review and that the obligation to 
maximize stockholder value only arises sometimes.  This advice can 
skew the decision-making process by placing too much emphasis on 
legal exposure and its potential mitigation via transaction structure. 
Directors should not be distracted by the overly formal legalisms of 
the Paramount doctrine.  They should do (and be advised to do) what 
they would naturally do: seek in good faith to obtain the best transaction 
for the stockholders, which could well be no transaction at all. 
Evaluating competing alternatives may be a complex and 
judgment-laden task, but it is not impossible.  To be certain, there are 
real-world distinctions among alternatives that affect how a board 
assesses the values of those alternatives.  For example, when weighing a 
transaction for consideration of 100% cash, the board may consider 
obvious issues like the likelihood of closure, the timing of payment, and 
tax effects.161  If the payment is in a foreign currency, the board might 
                                                                                                         
 160. See generally Morgan White-Smith, Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial 
Scrutiny of Mergers Depend on the Method of Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1177 
(2012). 
 161. See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 578 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(noting that when evaluating competing bids, the target board appropriately considered 
relative antitrust risk and contractual provisions addressing regulatory issues, indicating 
that “[v]alue is not value if it is not ultimately paid”). 
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consider exchange rate risk.  The board may consider other 
constituencies instrumentally, but only to the extent necessary to secure 
the cash deal.  Stay-bonuses to management, for example, may be 
necessary to keep the management team together until closing to ensure 
that the company is delivered intact to the buyer.  However, the board 
cannot consider the degree to which benefits to other constituencies 
might generate greater corporate value over the long term.162  There 
remains room for judgment, but the use of cash eliminates many of the 
discretionary assessments that directors must make. 
If the alternative is remaining independent, then a wider range of 
judgmental factors comes into play.  Most significantly, the board may 
consider and give significant weight to the possibility that benefits to 
constituencies other than the stockholders may result in superior value 
creation over time such that when viewed on a present-value, risk-
adjusted basis, remaining independent would generate greater value for 
stockholders than selling for cash.  The board may also anticipate that 
the company could be sold in the future for consideration which, when 
viewed on a present-value, risk-adjusted basis, makes remaining 
independent for the present the optimal choice.  In making these 
determinations, the board is not required to rely on a company’s stock 
market price to conduct the projecting and discounting exercise.163  The 
board is also not bound by the results of a discounted cash flow analysis 
or other valuation technique.  Directors are entitled to and must exercise 
judgment. 
                                                                                                         
 162. TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 1184 (Del. 
Ch. 1989) (“For [stockholders being eliminated for cash,] it does not matter that a buyer 
who will pay more cash plans to subject the corporation to a risky level of debt, or that 
a buyer who offers less cash will be a more generous employer for whom labor peace is 
more likely.”). 
 163. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 612 (“[O]ur law does not require a well-motivated 
board to simply sell the company whenever a high market premium is available (such 
as at a distress sale) or to eschew selling when a sales price is attractive in the board’s 
view, but the market premium is comparatively low, because the board believes the 
company is being valued quite fully.”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re 
Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 739 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (“But just as the Constitution does not enshrine Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s social statics, neither does the common law of directors’ duties elevate the 
theory of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text.”). 
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When evaluating a transaction where the consideration takes the 
form of stock, the directors’ task more closely resembles the type of 
analysis that a board would conduct regarding the alternative of 
remaining independent.  Because stockholders will receive an ownership 
interest in an ongoing entity, the directors are entitled to consider how 
that entity will generate value over the long-term.  Just as when 
considering the alternative of remaining independent, the board may 
anticipate that the company could be sold at some point in the future.  In 
a synergistic transaction, directors may account for the value that would 
be created by combining the two companies.  Any or all of these factors, 
when weighed by the board, may cause the directors to conclude that the 
share of the entity that the corporation’s pre-transaction stockholders 
would own post-transaction represents the best alternative available.  To 
the extent an alternative involves a combination of cash and stock, the 
relative size of the equity stake that the selling stockholders receive 
necessarily affects the degree to which value can be derived from the 
ongoing business and any eventual sale of the combined entity.  As in 
the standalone setting, the board is not required to rely on the stock 
market or the results of a discounted cash flow analysis. 
In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court called upon boards to make 
precisely these types of determinations.164  The court explained that 
when considering alternatives, “the directors should analyze the entire 
situation and evaluate in a disciplined manner the consideration being 
offered.”165  The court admonished that “[w]here stock or other non-cash 
consideration is involved, the board should try to quantify its value, if 
feasible, to achieve an objective comparison of the alternatives.”166  In a 
footnote, the court stressed that “[w]hen assessing the value of non-cash 
consideration, a board should focus on its value as of the date it will be 
received by the stockholders.”167  In reiterating its prior holdings that 
directors are not bound by the market price, the court stated that 
“[n]ormally, such value will be determined with the assistance of 
                                                                                                         
 164. See generally Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
 165. Id. at 44. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at n.14. 
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experts using generally accepted methods of valuation.”168  Therefore, a 
board is “not limited to considering only the amount of cash involved” 
and may account for “its view of the future value of a strategic 
alliance.”169  The court also stressed that 
the board may assess a variety of practical considerations relating to 
each alternative, including an offer’s fairness and feasibility; the 
proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequences of 
that financing; questions of illegality; the risk of non-consummation; 
the bidder’s identity, prior background and other business venture 
experiences; and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and 
their effects on stockholder interests.170 
The flexible process described in QVC can apply just as easily to stock-
for-stock deals as Revlon deals.  If anything, the absence of a post-
transaction controlling stockholder should make the analysis more 
straightforward.  In QVC, the post-transaction entity would have had a 
single person as its controlling stockholder, making the value of the 
strategic combination highly contingent.171  Without a post-transaction 
controlling stockholder, the board should have greater confidence in and 
be able to more readily assess “the future value of a strategic 
alliance.”172 
Directors must act in good faith and on an informed basis to pursue 
a course that maximizes value for stockholders.  This means that the 
directors must reach the conclusion that the alternative they have chosen 
does just that.  Enhanced scrutiny, as a standard of review, does not 
affect this core obligation, and QVC and its progeny demonstrate that 
judgmental factors can be pivotal in the board’s calculation.  Applying 
enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock deals makes clear that even though 
directors necessarily have greater occasion to weigh and assess 
                                                                                                         
 168. Id. at 44 (citing In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1132, 1161 (Del. Ch. 1989) (upholding Special Committee’s reliance on financial 
advisor and finding “quite sufficient bases to conclude that the opinions of the Special 
Committee’s advisors concerning prospective value of the respective packages (which 
largely reduced to quite different assessments of the relative values of the converting 
debentures and the convertible preferred) were competent and reached in good faith”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 171. See generally id. 
 172. Id. at 44. 
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judgmental factors when stockholders will hold or receive equity, the 
directors must conclude that the course they have adopted best 
maximizes value for stockholders, regardless of the transactional form 
selected.  Overruling the Paramount doctrine reunites the legal advice 
with the business reality facing the board. 
E. THE REASONABLENESS OF REVLON REVIEW 
For many, the desire to distinguish between Revlon deals and stock-
for-stock transactions appears driven by the belief that Revlon imposes 
specific conduct obligations on directors.  Under this view, Revlon is 
like the bogey-man.  It is big and bad and should be avoided if possible.  
As already discussed, Revlon does not impose specific conduct 
obligations and need not be feared. 
That said, any change in the standard of review, however small and 
theoretically tidy, could have knock-on effects for litigation.  Given the 
high stakes involved in M&A lawsuits, courts must approach any 
tinkering with great care.  On this point, there is good news.  Applying 
enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock deals will not change the way 
Delaware courts review transactions or affect the already excessive 
number of lawsuits challenging deals.  Although the standards of review 
under the Paramount doctrine nominally remain separate, in terms of 
actual litigation practice, the two types of transactions already have 
merged. 
1. No Effect on Litigation Volume 
If enhanced scrutiny caused stock-for-stock transactions to be 
examined more strictly, one logical consequence should include an 
increase in the number of suits against stock-for-stock deals and greater 
associated transaction costs.  As a practical matter, in the current 
litigation environment, stockholder plaintiffs do not discriminate 
between Revlon deals and stock-for-stock deals.173  Plaintiffs file and 
                                                                                                         
 173. See Leo E. Strine Jr., et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed 
Complaint 9–10 (Jan. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200499 (“In 2010 and 2011, 91% 
of all deals worth over $100 million were litigated, and these deals were targeted with 
an average of 5.1 lawsuits each.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also 
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT 
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seek pre-closing injunctive relief by alleging breaches of the duty of 
disclosure, which applies to all transactions, and by challenging the 
defensive provisions in the merger agreement, which are governed by 
enhanced scrutiny regardless.  The vast majority of M&A lawsuits settle 
for supplemental disclosures and an award of attorneys’ fees, regardless 
of the form of consideration.174 
2. No Distinction in the Injunction Phase 
If a case proceeds to a decision during the injunction phase, there is 
no distinction in how the Delaware courts handle Revlon deals versus 
stock-for-stock deals.  In both contexts, the Delaware courts examine the 
disclosures and defensive measures, and then leave the decision on 
value to the stockholders. 
When considering an injunction application, a Delaware court 
initially focuses on whether stockholders have the necessary information 
to vote on the transaction, including information about actual and 
potential conflicts.  The court then defers to the stockholders’ decision.  
When a plaintiff asks the Court of Chancery “to enjoin a transaction and 
another higher-priced alternative is not immediately available, [the 
court] has been appropriately modest about playing games with other 
people’s [i.e., the stockholders’] money.”175  This is true even when the 
plaintiff has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits.176 
After all, even when a sufficient merits showing is made by a 
plaintiff, this court is justifiably reluctant to enjoin a premium-
generating transaction when no other option is available, except 
insofar as is necessary for the disclosure of additional information to 
                                                                                                         
DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
3 (2012) (providing statistics supporting theory that all transactions regardless of form 
of consideration are litigated). 
 174. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 173, at 8 (cataloging the disposition of 
565 challenged transactions in 2010-2011, finding “153 (27 percent) were voluntarily 
dismissed by the plaintiffs, twenty-three (4 percent) were dismissed by the court with 
prejudice, and 389 (69 percent) settled,” and noting the “large majority of settlements . . 
. settled for additional disclosures only”). 
 175. In re Netsmart Techs. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 176. See generally In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 715 
(Del. Ch. 2001). 
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permit stockholders to make an informed decision whether to 
tender.177 
There is no Paramount doctrine for disclosure issues.  In a stock-
for-stock transaction, just as in a Revlon deal, directors must make a 
merger recommendation.178  In both contexts, directors must comply 
with their fiduciary duty of disclosure.179  If disclosure deficiencies 
threaten to render the stockholder vote uninformed, Delaware courts 
regularly find that irreparable harm exists and enjoin the vote pending 
the issuance of supplemental disclosures.180  “By issuing an injunction 
                                                                                                         
 177. Id.; accord In re El Paso Corp. S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 433 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (finding reasonable likelihood of success on merits but denying preliminary 
injunction where “the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to 
turn down the Merger themselves”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 
618 (Del. Ch. 2010) (ruling that balance of harms tilted against injunction because 
stockholders could decide for themselves to vote deal down and take the chance of 
receiving an actionable higher bid); In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 516 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“[W]here a selling Board’s alleged Revlon violations occur in the 
absence of another viable bid, this Court often finds injunctive relief to be inappropriate 
because it would be imprudent to terminate the only deal available, when the 
stockholders can make that decision for themselves.”) (footnote omitted); In re Toys 
“R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1023 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he bottom line is 
that the public shareholders will have an opportunity . . . to reject the merger if they do 
not think that the price is high enough in light of the Company’s stand-alone value and 
other options.”); H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
633, 12 (Del. Ch. 1997) (declining to enjoin vote on friendly merger to allow 
stockholders first to elect hostile bidder’s nominees: “If Great Western’s shareholders 
wish to elect Ahmanson’s nominees to the board, they need only vote down the 
Washington Mutual merger proposal at the merger meeting, and then vote for 
Ahmanson’s nominees at the rescheduled annual meeting”). 
 178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)-(c) (2013). 
 179. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (“[D]irectors of Delaware 
corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material 
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.”); Zirn v. VLI 
Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. 1996) (finding a disclosure violation in a cash 
transaction where a partial disclosure was “misleading”); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. 
Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994) (finding a potential disclosure violation 
in a stock-for-stock transaction where “partial disclosures” were “misleading”). 
 180. See, e.g., Berger v. Pubco Corp., No. 3413, 2008 WL 2224107, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
May 30, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 976 A.2d 132 (Del. 2009) (“A disclosure 
violation results in an irreparable injury.”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207 (“[T]his court 
has typically found a threat of irreparable injury to exist when it appears stockholders 
may make an important voting decision on inadequate disclosures.”); Allen v. News 
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requiring additional disclosure, the court gives stockholders the choice 
to think for themselves on full information, thereby vindicating their 
rights as stockholders to make important voting and remedial decisions 
based on their own economic self-interest.”181 
Delaware courts also examine the deal-protection devices in the 
merger agreement.   As already explained, there is no Paramount 
doctrine here either, and the standard of review is always enhanced 
scrutiny.182  From a practical standpoint, because Delaware courts 
examine the defensive measures in stock-for-stock merger agreements 
using enhanced scrutiny, the Delaware courts are already reviewing the 
transaction process in precisely the same manner as they would if 
enhanced scrutiny applied to the transaction as a whole.  A reviewing 
court must conduct this analysis because when directors develop greater 
information about alternatives and conduct greater price-discovery 
before signing a deal, the directors can reasonably grant greater deal 
protections in connection with the deal.  By contrast, when directors are 
less informed, their lack of knowledge calls for retaining greater 
flexibility for price-discovery and the development of alternatives to 
occur after signing.183  The judicial task of determining whether the 
                                                                                                         
Corp., No. 979, 2005 WL 415095, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2005) (“At this early stage, 
plaintiffs have demonstrated a ‘sufficiently colorable claim’ that the disclosures 
contained in News’ proxy materials are materially deficient or misleading and that there 
is a ‘possibility of a threatened irreparable injury,’ namely the loss of the ability by the 
Fox shareholders to have all pertinent information available at the time they decide 
whether to tender their shares into the exchange offer, if expedition is not granted.”) 
(footnote omitted); In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 18 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (“This disclosure violation threatens irreparable harm because stockholders may 
vote ‘yes’ on a transaction they otherwise would have voted ‘no’ on if they had access 
to full or nonmisleading disclosures regarding the CICs.”). 
 181. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207. 
 182. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d 
1140, 1151 (Del. 1989). 
 183. See David Fox & Daniel Wolf, Deal Protection: One Size Does Not Fit All, 
PRAC. L. J. (Mar. 2010) (noting that the extensiveness of a pre-signing market check 
ought to be considered in evaluating the use of deal protections); Mark Lebovitch & 
Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining the Validity of Deal Protection 
Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 51–52 
(2001) (“Under the framework that we believe the Delaware courts are applying, the 
severity of the particular Deal Protections used bears a positive correlation to the need 
for a thorough market check and/or broad fiduciary out. Put simply, not all Deal 
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directors acted reasonably in protecting their transaction is not 
appreciably different from determining whether the directors acted 
reasonably in selecting their transaction. 
3. No Distinction in the Post-Closing Phase 
For those cases that reach the post-closing phase, there is still no 
distinction between stock-for-stock transactions and Revlon deals. 
The fact that a corporate board has decided to engage in a change of 
control transaction invoking so-called Revlon duties does not change 
the showing of culpability a plaintiff must make in order to hold the 
directors liable for monetary damages.  For example, if a board 
unintentionally fails, as a result of gross negligence and not of bad 
faith or self-interest, to follow up on a materially higher bid and an 
exculpatory charter provision is in place, then the plaintiff will be 
barred from recovery, regardless of whether the board was in 
Revlon-land.184 
Complaints against Revlon transactions are subject to dismissal on the 
pleadings for failure to plead facts sufficient to overcome an exculpatory 
charter provision.185  Challenges to Revlon transactions are likewise 
                                                                                                         
Protections function in a similar fashion, boards can perform market checks of varying 
intensity, and boards can adopt fiduciary outs of varying breadth. Therefore, the 
framework operates on a sliding scale.”); Mark A. Morton & Roxanne L. Houtman, Go-
Shops: Market Check Magic or Mirage? (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/05/20070509%20Go%20Shops—
Market%20Check%20Magic%20or%20Mirage.pdf (“A transaction that follows a full 
auction or involves multiple bidders may warrant more restrictive deal protections, such 
as a higher termination fee, a matching right and a more limited no shop provision, 
because the market has been canvassed for potential bidders.”). 
 184. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 185. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1085–95 (Del. 2001) (holding 
“that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cognizable claim [under Revlon]” 
and that “even if plaintiffs had stated a claim for gross negligence, such a well-pleaded 
claim is unavailing because defendants have brought forth the Section 102(b)(7) 
[exculpatory] charter provision”); see also In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311, 7 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The [c]omplaint does not allege 
facts that support a reasonable inference that the Board consciously disregarded its so-
called Revlon duties.”); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 641 (Del. Ch. 
2008) (“[W]here . . . the directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision, it is 
critical that the complaint plead facts suggesting a fair inference that the directors 
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susceptible to motions for summary judgment unless the plaintiff can 
produce evidence that the board “utterly failed to attempt to attain” the 
transaction offering the best value for stockholders.186 
Even for directors serving those rare corporations without 
exculpatory provisions in their charters, the approach to determining 
liability should not change.  A transactional standard of review is, at its 
core, an inquiry designed to address whether the court should respect the 
transaction itself or whether, for equitable reasons, it should set it aside 
or impose an alternative remedy.  The court’s analysis of the transaction 
“has only a crude and potentially misleading relationship to the liability 
of any particular fiduciary.”187  Director culpability is assessed and a 
potential damages remedy imposed on a director-by-director basis.188  
The likelihood of an actual liability finding remains low for directors 
who did not receive transaction-specific benefits.  Therefore, applying 
                                                                                                         
breached their duty of loyalty by making a bad faith decision to approve the merger for 
reasons inimical to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Where a 
complaint . . . does not even create an inference of mere negligence or gross negligence, 
it certainly does not satisfy the far more difficult task of stating a non-exculpated duty 
of loyalty claim.”); McMillan, 768 A.2d at 496 (“[T]he complaint alleges no facts from 
which a reasonable inference can be drawn that any conflicting self-interest or bad faith 
motive caused the defendant directors to fail to meet their obligations to seek the 
highest attainable value.”); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731–32 
(Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom., Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (“If 
a complaint merely alleges that the directors were grossly negligent in performing their 
duties in selling the corporation, without some factual basis to suspect their 
motivations, any subsequent finding of liability will, necessarily, depend on finding 
breaches of the duty of care, not loyalty or good faith.”). 
 186. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009). 
 187. Venhill Ltd. P’ship v. Hillman, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 982, 22 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(discussing the entire fairness standard of review). 
 188. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16,415, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *38–43 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“The liability of the directors must be 
determined on an individual basis because the nature of their breach of duty (if any), 
and whether they are exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each 
director.”); see also GPC XLI L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc. (In re Loral 
Space & Commc’ns Inc.), 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 670, 22 (Del. Ch. 2008) (assessing 
individual culpability of members of a special negotiating committee in approving an 
interested transaction with a controlling stockholder); Venhill, 2008 WL 2270488, at 
*29–33 (assessing the culpability of the general partner in executing self-interested 
transactions and fashioning an appropriate remedy). 
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enhanced scrutiny to all negotiated acquisitions, regardless of the form 
of consideration, should not affect litigation rates or outcomes. 
III. A CALL TO CLARIFY THE LAW  
In my view, Delaware law could be helpfully clarified and 
simplified if the Delaware Supreme Court clearly announced that          
(i) Revlon is a form of enhanced scrutiny, and (ii) enhanced scrutiny 
applies to negotiated acquisitions, regardless of the form of 
consideration, because of the final period problem.  Only the Delaware 
Supreme Court sitting en banc can accomplish this change because it 
would require overruling the Paramount doctrine. 
Recognizing Revlon as a form of enhanced scrutiny that turns on 
reasonableness would foreclose still-recurring arguments about the 
parameters of so-called “Revlon duties” and what actions are supposedly 
required (or forbidden) in the “radically altered state.”189  This limited 
exercise in doctrinal pruning also would eliminate the debate over what 
standard of review should apply to mergers in which the consideration is 
a mix of cash and stock.  Parties in litigation over mixed consideration 
transactions currently devote significant resources to debating the 
standard of review.  Likewise, parties litigating pure stock-for-stock 
transactions would not have to differentiate in their briefing between the 
merger itself, to which the business judgment rule now applies, and the 
defensive measures in the merger agreement, to which enhanced 
scrutiny applies.  Parties in both settings would know that enhanced 
scrutiny was the standard of review, allowing them to focus their efforts 
on presenting or attacking the reasonableness of the board’s purposes 
and the means selected to achieve them. 
More importantly, by making this announcement, the Delaware 
Supreme Court would give clear guidance to directors and advisors that 
a board of directors of a Delaware corporation must always seek to 
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of the 
undifferentiated equity, and that the only factor that changes from a 
legal standpoint is the standard of review used to evaluate the directors’ 
decisions.  When faced with competing strategic alternatives involving 
different forms of consideration, directors could focus squarely on 
                                                                                                         
 189. TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 1185 (Del. Ch. 
1989). 
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seeking the best transaction reasonably available for the stockholders 
rather than being told that different third-party transaction structures 
would subject them to different duties or different standards of review. 
For reasons already discussed, changing the law in this fashion 
should not alter the substance of how mergers are reviewed.  It would 
not create an expanded universe of transactions in which directors must 
conduct auctions or follow judicially drafted checklists, precisely 
because there is no such universe to begin with.  Nor would it require 
boards to eschew stock transactions in favor of cash deals. 
In fact, under this approach, Time-Warner would have come out 
precisely the same way.  The proof lies in Chancellor Allen’s trial court 
decision, where after distinguishing Revlon, he conducted the type of 
enhanced scrutiny analysis that this Article envisions under the heading 
of a separate application of Unocal review.  After weighing the 
evidence, he concluded that the Time board had carried its burden of 
proof and showed that it reasonably believed, in good faith, that in the 
long run, the Time-Warner combination would produce greater benefits 
to stockholders than Paramount’s cash bid would.190  The value available 
to Time’s post-transaction stockholders included not only the present 
value of the long-term benefits achievable through the combination, but 
also the present value of the possibility of a control premium in a future 
sale.191  A board considering a stock-for-stock transaction could rely on 
these and other considerations to conclude that the value of the stock-
for-stock alternative was the best transaction reasonably available. 
CONCLUSION  
“[I]n the law, to an extent present in few other human institutions, 
there may be in the long run as much importance ascribed to the 
reasoning said to justify action, as there is in the actions themselves.”192  
Revlon did not sufficiently or clearly explain why enhanced scrutiny 
                                                                                                         
 190. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 733 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) 
(“Directors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is ‘wrong’ in 
some sense, without breaching faith with shareholders. No one, after all, has access to 
more information concerning the corporation’s present and future condition.”). 
 191. See id. (noting that the combined entity would not be too large to acquire). 
 192. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132, 1156 n.13 
(Del. Ch. 1989). 
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applied, and the powerful metaphor of director-auctioneers 
overwhelmed other aspects of the opinion.193  Delaware decisions now 
consistently recognize that the Delaware Supreme Court applied 
enhanced scrutiny in Revlon because of concern about potential conflicts 
of interest.194  This rationale applies equally to stock-for-stock deals.195  
By issuing an opinion overruling the Paramount doctrine and applying 
enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock deals, the Delaware Supreme Court 
would confirm that Revlon is a form of enhanced scrutiny and provide a 
comprehensible and coherent rationale for how the Delaware courts 
approach negotiated acquisitions.  It also would simplify an 
unnecessarily complex area of Delaware jurisprudence.  These benefits 
in turn will enhance the legitimacy of Delaware’s legal system. 
                                                                                                         
 193. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 194. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 195. See discussion supra Part II. 
